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Abstract
Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to
elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on
the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of
economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have
observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases.
The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly
improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher
average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of
punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders
in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large
fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
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Introduction
Approximately two million years ago some hominids were
beginning to evolve larger brains and body size and to mature
more slowly than other apes [1]. This likely procreated serious
challenges in rearing offspring that survived. Faced with such
evolutionary pressures, members of the genus Homo begun helping
each other, in particularly provisioning for the young of others
regardless of kinship [2]. Today, we are known as the super-
cooperators [3], and it is beyond doubt that selfless cooperative
behavior between unrelated individuals is one of the key pillars of
our remarkable evolutionary success. The temptations to defect,
however, have been present in the past as they are now, and we
are well aware of the fact that defection may lead to the tragedy of
the commons [4]. But since we are no longer threatened by other
species – in fact, it seems difficult to dispute that the biggest
challenges today are of our own production – the primal motive to
cooperate is gone. We must rely on our cultural heritage and
upbringing as well as between-group conflicts to maintain in-group
solidarity [5].
Perhaps not surprisingly, we have come to appreciate actions
that may promote cooperation, most notably punishment [6,7],
even to the point of institutionalization [8–13]. The problem is
that punishment is costly, and it is far from clear who should be the
ones to pay. We can be quick to conclude that obviously it would
be on the cooperators to trace down and punish defectors. Yet
cooperators already have a personal disadvantage over defectors,
and adding yet another could prove too much to bare in a
competitive environment. The emergence of second-order free-
riding, i.e., contributing to the common pool but not to
sanctioning, therefore seems inevitable [14–19], and in fact
presents the biggest threat to the success of punishment [20–22].
The hope, or rather the assumption, is that in the long run
punishment would pay off, so that the additional investments
would be offset by increased levels of cooperation. There exists
evidence, both theoretical and experimental, in support of such an
assumption [23–29], but there are also studies asserting that costly
punishment is maladaptive [30,31], and that it can be challenged
by antisocial punishment [32–35] as well as reward [36]. The stick
versus carrot dilemma [37] has recently received ample attention
[38–45], and the subject of antisocial punishment has also been
contested with loners [46], which were originally studied in
[47,48]. It is safe to conclude that there are still many open issues
that require further research.
Here we investigate the impact of punishment from a somewhat
different perspective, namely how humans react when being
subject to punishment. When a defector is punished, she essentially
has two options on how to proceed. One is to keep defecting in the
hope that the withdrawn contribution to the common pool will
make up for future sanctions, while second is to decide to
cooperate and thus avoid further sanctions. It is a dilemma that is
likely to be decided based on the severity of punishment as well as
the cost-to-benefit ratio of the game. Punishment can be
considered as being effective if a high fraction of punished
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 5 | e64677
defectors chooses to cooperate in the next round. To clarify this,
we have conducted economic experiments [49] (recent examples
of research are [50–55]) based on the snowdrift game played in
groups [56], where the two main free parameters were the severity
of punishment and the cost-to-benefit ratio. In the realm of the
game (see Methods for details), the cost-to-benefit ratio determines
just how severe the social dilemma is. Low cost-to-benefit ratios
constitute lenient conditions for the evolution of cooperation, while
high costs and low benefits favor defection. As we will show, the
effectiveness of different punishment regimes depends sensitively
on the cost-to-benefit ratio. If costs are low, the application of
severe punishment is not more effective than mild punishment, yet
it does lead to lower overall payoffs and hence is not
recommended. Only if costs are high does severe punishment
outperform mild punishment in terms of persuading more
defectors to adopt cooperation in the next round. We proceed
by presenting the main results in support of these conclusions, first
by focusing on the outcome of the game in the absence and
subsequently in the presence of punishment.
Results
The impact of punishment on the outcome of the game can be
understood well only if the same economic experiments are carried
out also without the possibility of this action. We therefore first
conduct experiments in the absence of punishment to arrive at a
baseline scenario, in particular to estimate the general willingness
of players to cooperate at different values of the cost-to-benefit
ratio. Subsequently, we will use this as a reference point for the
snowdrift game with punishment.
The Snowdrift Game without Punishment
To illustrate the snowdrift game, imagine two drivers that are
caught in a blizzard and trapped on either side of a snowdrift [57].
They can either get out and start shoveling (cooperate) or remain
in the car (defect). If both cooperate, they have the benefit b of
getting home while sharing the labor c. Thus, R~b{c=2, which
indicates the Reward for both cooperators. If both defect, they do
not get anywhere and hence incur the punishment P~0. If only
one shovels, however, they both get home but the defector avoids
the labor cost and gets the Temptation T~b, whereas the
cooperator gets the Sucker’s payoff S~b{c. The four payoff
values in the snowdrift game rank in order: TwRwSwP, and
r~c=(2b{c) illustrates the cost-to-benefit ratio. If we fix
R~b{c=2~1, then r~c=(2b{c)~c=2, T~1zr and
S~1{r, and the payoff matrix thus becomes:
C D
C
D
1 1{r
1zr 0
  ð1Þ
To have a reference point for the actual impact of punishment,
as noted, we first study how the frequency of cooperation varies
with the cost-to-benefit ratio r. In the TreatmentI including eight
sessions, cooperators were not allowed to punish defectors, and six
different values of cost-to-benefit ratio r were set (four sessions for
r~0:2 and r~0:8, other four sessions for other values of r). In
each session 20 undergraduate students were randomly allocated
to four groups of five subjects playing snowdrift games in the
Computer Lab for Behavior Games [for further information see
the Methods section and the first figure in Text S1]. As it is
expected, both the level of cooperation fc and the average payoff
per period decrease with increasing of r, as demonstrated in Figs. 1
(a) and (b), respectively. These results signal clearly the conflict
between the individual and group interests: the best strategy for
individuals is to defect if the opponent adopts cooperation.
Consequently, the total payoff of the whole group falls gradually
by increasing r, which prompts more individuals to choose
defection to gain a higher individual payoff. In the end, when
the cost-to-benefit ratio r is large, both individual and the group
benefits become minimal. The Kruskal-Wallis test for results
presented in Fig. 1 (a) yields x25~53:923 and P~0:0001 for
individual-level data, and x25~27:782 and p~0:0001 for group-
level data. For Fig. 1 (b), on the other hand, we obtain
x25~131:103 and p~0:0001 for individual-level data, and
x25~27:757 and P~0:0001 for group-level data. In addition, we
present details of the regression analysis for results presented in
Fig. 1 in tables of Text S1. This statistical analysis indicates clearly
that the cost-to-benefit ratio indeed does have a statistically
significant impact on the cooperation level and the average payoff.
In addition to the average values of strategies we also monitored
how often players change strategies at different values of r. We
found that defectors adhere to defection as we increase r.
Cooperators, on the other hand, do not insist on cooperation at
high r. Figures 2 (a) and (b) show the percentage of defectors
selecting defection and cooperators selecting cooperation in the
next round among all the subjects that changed strategies in the
next round. We found that the percentage of defectors choosing to
stick with defection increases from 13% at r~0:1 to 72.75% at
r~0:9, while that of cooperators choosing to cooperate anew
declines from 53.25% at r~0:1 to 6.5% at r~0:9. Furthermore,
we have also monitored the fraction of individuals who always
choose to cooperate (ALLC) and those who always choose to
defect (ALLD) among all the subjects. Interestingly, these values
depend sensitively on the cost-to-benefit ratio. As the dotted lines
in Fig. 1 show, the percentage of ALLD increases greatly from 0%
at r~0:1 to 25% at r~0:9, while the percentage of ALLC reduces
from 10% at r~0:1 to 0% suddenly for higher r values. These
Figure 1. Higher cost-to-benefit ratios in the snowdrift game
lead to lower levels of cooperation. Depicted are results of an
economic experiment, as obtained in the absence of punishment.
Panels (a) and (b) show the frequency of cooperation fc and the average
payoff per period in dependence on the cost-to-benefit ratio r,
respectively. The whiskers in panels (a) and (b) show the 95%
confidence intervals for the frequency of cooperation and for the
average payoffs, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677.g001
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observations suggest that the subjects are in general ‘‘flexible’’ in
responding to the change of external conditions (here determined
by the value of r), and are thus well aware and concerned for their
individual success.
The Snowdrift Game with Punishment
To investigate the effectiveness of punishment when applying
different fines, we focus on r~0:2 and r~0:8, because these two
values of the cost-to-benefit ratio represent typical conditions
constituting low and high costs of cooperation, respectively (see
Figs. 1 and 2). For the sake of simplicity, there were two stages
making up sessions TreatmentII and TreatmentIII , namely the
playing game stage and the peer punishment stage. During the first
stage, subjects played the snowdrift game with other group
members. Similarly as in TreatmentI , there were four groups
containing five subjects each. During the second stage, cooperators
were given the chance to punish defectors on a peer-to-peer
(individual) basis as follows. If there was at least one cooperator
who accepted the cost of punishment, then all the payoffs of all
defector in the group were reduced by a fine p, and simultaneously
the punisher’s profit was also reduced by a single unit, which was
the costs of punishment. We should stress that the cost of
punishment was always constant at different values of fine.
Therefore the results we observed primarily focus on the reaction
of defectors being punished and not the dilemma of cooperators
whether to punish or not. The latter dilemma, however, still exist
because those who cooperate but do not punish can be considered
as second free-riders. Table 1 illustrates the applied parameter
values for TreatmentII and TreatmentIII .
When the cost-to-benefit ratio is low (r = 0.2), the application of
larger fines does not yield a more favorable outcome than the
application of lower fines. Naturally, the chance to punish
defectors will improve the cooperation level but, as Fig. 3 (a)
shows, higher fines will not increase fC further. On the other hand,
the average payoff of group members will be reduced, especially so
for severe punishment, as illustrated in Fig. 3 (c). Beside the
Kruskal-Wallis test we have also calculated the 95% confidence
intervals to compare the impacts of punishment at low r. While fC
is in the (0.708,0.846) interval for p~2:0, and in (0.653,0.889) for
p~4:0, signaling not detectable differences, the average payoffs
are definitely different: the corresponding confidence interval is
(3.407,3.557) for p~2:0, and (3.093,3.404) for p~4:0. In
agreement with previous observations [30], the uselessness of too
hard punishments could be an important message for those who
are in a position to establish the means of punishment in our
society.
Interestingly, the relevance of severe punishment becomes more
prominent when the external conditions to cooperate become
significantly worse. When the cost-to-benefit ratio is high (r~0:8),
the application of higher fines will gradually elevate the
cooperation level beyond what could be achieved by mild
punishment. As shown in Fig. 3 (b), fC can be doubled due to
severe punishment. The impact on the average payoff is also
positive, given that cooperation is virtually absent in the absence of
punishment. This is hence a very much desired outcome one
would expect from punishment. It is important to emphasize,
however, that low fines will still yield a similar outcome as we have
observed for r~0:2. Namely, as Fig. 2 (d) clearly illustrates, the
usage of p~2:0 increases fC , but the average payoff is lower than
in the punishment-free case. The corresponding 95% confidence
interval is (1.717,2.154) for the punishment-free case and
(1.311,1.707) for p~2:0.
Results presented thus far indicate that the value of fine should
be carefully adjusted in agreement with the general conditions that
characterize the severity of the social dilemma the players are
facing. If the conditions are such that cooperation is likely and
viable even in the absence of punishment, then severe sanctioning
of defective behavior should be avoided as it leads to lower average
payoffs. On the other hand, in strongly defection-prone environ-
ments, where cooperators hardly have a chance to survive in the
absence of additional regulations, severe punishment appears to be
the correct and indeed the only effective means to evoke a change
for the better.
To reveal the microscopic details governing the choices during
the conducted economic experiments, we have also determined
the rate of groups that had different numbers of cooperators
during all the considered periods. For example, there were 83
groups with three cooperators in the total of 168 groups for all the
periods in the absence of punishment at r~0:2. Therefore the rate
of groups with three cooperators is 83=168&0:49. This is the most
common formation, as shown in Fig. 4 (a). If punishment was
applied at r~0:2, then the most typical group would contain four
cooperators and one defector to form the five group members.
Fig. 4 (a) also illustrates that not just the average fC but also the
probability distributions of different groups are very similar when
we applied different punishment strengths. This explains why a
more severe punishment is less recommended in this case: it has no
additional impact on the strategy choice of players, and hence it
only contributes to additionally reducing the payoffs of defectors.
Figure 2. Statistics on when cooperators continue to cooperate
and defectors continue to defect, and vice versa, in the
absence of punishment. Panel (a) shows the percentage of defectors
choosing defection in the next round and the percentage of individuals
who always defect in dependence on the cost-to-benefit ratio r. Panel
(b) shows the percentage of cooperators choosing cooperation in the
next round and the percentage of individuals who always cooperate in
dependence on the cost-to-benefit ratio r.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677.g002
Table 1. Game parameters employed during TreatmentII
and TreatmentIII in the snowdrift game with punishment.
SD game conditions low cost high cost
Treatment II r = 0.2, p= 2.0; r = 0.8, p= 2.0
Treatment III r = 0.2, p= 4.0; r = 0.8, p= 4.0
Treatment II corresponds to mild punishment because the fines (p) for defection
are low, while Treatment III corresponds to severe punishment because of the
application of comparatively high penalties.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677.t001
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This may have a negative psychological side effect, as it makes it
less likely that such ‘‘paralyzed’’ players will attempt reintegration
by means of the less profitable cooperative approach.
If cooperation is costly, however, the distribution of strategies
within the groups changes significantly, as shown in Fig. 4 (b).
Here, the most common group contains only a single cooperator
in the absence of punishment. Moreover, there is a significant
fraction of groups, about 20% of them, which completely fulfill the
makings of the tragedy of the commons as therein everybody
chooses to defect. If we apply punishment then the number of
cooperators nc increases, and indeed the maximum of the
distribution moves towards higher nc. In particular, it is at nc~2
when p~2:0 and at nc~3 for p~4:0. In agreement with our
previous conclusion, here the application of severe punishment will
significantly reduce the number of defectors, and this reduction
comfortably makes up for the losses in overall payoff that are
charged to defectors because of the larger value of p.
To arrive at addressing our principal goal, which regards the
effectiveness of punishment, we have also determined the
percentage of defectors who select defection and cooperators
who choose cooperation in the next round among all players who
change strategy. Figures 5 (a) and (b) show these ratios for low and
high costs of cooperation, i.e., r~0:2 and 0:8, respectively. In
comparison with the data obtained without punishment (plotted in
Fig. 2), we found that for r~0:2 there is a slight increase in opting
to cooperate and decrease in opting to defect, but the value of fine
plays a rather insignificant role in mediating this decision. As we
have already observed, this changes significantly if a high cost-to-
benefit ratio characterizes the snowdrift game. Here the percent-
age of cooperators staying cooperators increases from 27.0% for
p~2:0 to 49.7% for p~4:0, and the percentage of defectors
deciding to defect again reduces from 50.4% for p~2:0 to 22.4%
for p~4:0. For a deeper insight we have also calculated how the
probability of changing strategy depends on the actions of the
others in the group (on the number of cooperative opponents) at
different values of r values, as summarized in the second figure of
Text S1. This further strengthens the conclusion that the proper
impact of punishment on individual decision making might
depend sensitively on other elementary circumstances, like in
Figure 3. Mild punishment outperforms severe punishment if the conditions for cooperation are favorable. Panels (a) and (c) show the
frequency of cooperation and the average payoff per period in the absence of punishment, for punishment with p~2:0, and for punishment with
p~4:0, as obtained when the cost-to-benefit ratio is r~0:2 (low). Panels (b) and (d) show the frequency of cooperation and the average payoff per
period in the absence of punishment, for punishment with p~2:0, and for punishment with p~4:0, as obtained when the cost-to-benefit ratio is
r~0:8 (high). Only if cooperation is very unlikely in the absence of sanctions does severe punishment reveal its advantages. The whiskers in panels (a)
and (b) show the 95% confidence intervals for the frequency of cooperation, while the whiskers in panels (c) and (d) show the same for the average
payoffs.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677.g003
Figure 4. Distribution of strategies within groups depends not
just on the severity of punishment, but also on the severity of
the social dilemma. Panels (a) and (b) depict the rate of groups
having nc cooperators, as obtained for TreatmentI (without punish-
ment), TreatmentII (punishment with p~2:0), and TreatmentIII
(punishment with p~4:0), at r~0:2 and r~0:8, respectively. Only if
r~0:8 is severe punishment more effective. If cooperation is likely
(r~0:2) mild punishment is at least just as effective in sustaining highly
cooperative groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677.g004
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our case, how beneficial it is to defect instead of to cooperate to
begin with.
Staying further at the high cost regime, we note that it is difficult
to distinguish accurately the motivation of a defector to choose
cooperation in the next round, because the fluctuations of a person
to choose a different strategy in the next round amount to about
12%, as shown in the third figure of Text S1. We argue that the
primary purpose of punishment ought to be to turn defectors into
cooperators at the next time of asking. As shown in the fourth
figure of Text S1, the percentage of defectors who choose
cooperation in the next round because of being punished in the
current round increases from 8% to 11% when the fine is
increased. To test this further, we can define the effectiveness of
punishment Ep as the rate of defectors who choose cooperation in
the next round after being punished. As shown in Fig. 6 (a), the
effectiveness of punishment using p~2:0 is equal or even a bit
larger than that of p~4:0 when the cost-to-benefit ratio is low
(r~0:2). Since here two rather than three setups are tested against
statistical relevance, we apply the t-test, which yields Pw0:05.
This indicates that, for r~0:2, there are indeed no statistically
relevant differences between the effectiveness of punishment with
p~2:0 and p~4:0. The difference at r~0:8, depicted in Fig. 6 (b),
is rather more spectacular. There the higher fine is much more
effective in converting defectors to cooperators, and indeed it
corroborates the necessity of severe punishment in adverse
environments. Here the t-test yields Pv0:0001, clearly confirming
statistically relevant differences between the two punishment
modes at r~0:8.
Discussion
We have conducted economic experiments centered around the
snowdrift game played in groups of five, with the aim of
determining the effectiveness of severe and mild punishment to
persuade defectors to choose cooperation in the next round of the
game. With the assumption that the propensity of the environment
itself to promote or deter cooperation likely plays an important
role, we have tested the impact of severe and mild punishment
under a cooperation-prone and under a defection-prone setup of
the snowdrift game. We have observed that benefits of severe
punishment emerge only under adverse conditions, when to
cooperate is highly unlikely in the absence of sanctions. If the
conditions are favorable or at least not unfavorable, mild
punishment is not less effective. In particular, if cooperation is
likely, mild punishment is just as effective as severe punishment in
persuading defectors to choose cooperation. But since the fines
imposed by severe punishment are higher, the overall welfare is
lower than by mild punishment. Severe punishment fails to offset
the imposed fines and costs associated with its execution, and so
the players would be better of without it. Importantly, this holds
even under the lenient assumption that the cost of punishment is
independent of the severity of punishment. If the costs would scale
with the imposed fines, the effectiveness of severe punishment
would be even worse. However, if the conditions for cooperation
are unfavorable, then only severe punishment is able to revert the
players from defecting, and it is also then that it has a positive
impact on the average payoff and is in fact sustainable.
The presented results indicate that it is far from obvious to know
how large fines should be applied to elevate the overall welfare,
even if the costs do not scale with the imposed penalties. Contrary
to what could be assumed, even if we have the means to punish
hard, doing so is likely not an optimal decision. It can be a viable
one if the conditions are really adverse and unfavorable for the
evolution of cooperation. In general, however, mild punishment is
not less effective as severe punishment, with the added benefit that
the imposed fines make it easier for the punished individuals to
reintegrate into the society. In view of these observations, we
conclude that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from
the imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background.
Small fines work just as well as high fines in motivating us to chose
cooperation over defection. Punishing excessively hard seldom has
additional benefits, but it does have the potential to disable the
punished individual, and it also decreases the overall welfare more
than punishing mild or moderately. Neither of these two side
effects is desirable, and thus we conclude that severe punishment
should be utilized only when absolutely necessary. It seems less
harm can be done by adopting mild punishment and risking a few
more persistent defectors, then it is to endorse severe punishment
in the name of total cooperation.
Figure 5. If to cooperate is a very difficult proposition, severe
punishment is more likely to divert from defection and
perpetuate cooperation than mild punishment. Depicted is the
statistics on when cooperators continue to cooperate (red) and
defectors continue to defect (green) under mild (p~2:0) and severe
(p~4:0) punishment. In panel (a), for r~0:2, mild punishment is just as
effective as severe punishment in maintaining the strategy choices. In
panel (b), for r~0:8, mild punishment is less effective. If punishment is
severe, cooperators are more likely to continue cooperating (red), while
defectors are less likely to continue defecting (green) than if
punishment is mild.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677.g005
Figure 6. If cooperation is likely the effectiveness of mild
punishment is just as high as the effectiveness of severe
punishment. Panels (a) and (b) present results obtained for r~0:2 and
r~0:8, respectively. It can be observed that for r~0:2, when the
likelihood of cooperation is high even in the absence of sanctioning
(see Fig. 1), mild punishment is just as effective as severe punishment.
Conversely, for r~0:8 severe punishment leads to a higher percentage
of defectors that after being punished choose to cooperate (Ep) than
mild punishment. The whiskers in panels (a) and (b) show the 95%
confidence intervals for the effectiveness of punishment Ep .
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677.g006
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Methods
A total of 320 undergraduate students (45% females, 20:3 years
old on average) from Wenzhou University participated in repeated
snowdrift games taking place in groups of five at the Computer
Lab of Behavior Games. Students that participated did so by
answering a public call that was issued by the Computer Lab of
Behavior Games of Wenzhou University. The ethics committee of
the Wenzhou University approved the public call and the
experiments. All the participants provided their written informed
consent to participate in the study. Prior to participation, they
have also learned the rules of the game and subsequently
demonstrated their understanding in a short test.
The 20 subjects in a session were allocated anonymously to four
groups consisting of five subjects each by means of the z-Tree
software [58]. Subsequently, subjects played the snowdrift game
with all the members in the same group. Since participants were
freshmen and sophomore students with different major fields,
coming from different departments, they were unlikely to know
each other. In addition, subjects were not allowed to participate in
more than a single session of the experiment. A total of sixteen
sessions were conducted from May to December 2012. Three
different treatments were conducted. Namely, experiments with-
out punishment for different cost-to-benefit ratios r (TreatmentI ),
experiments with punishment with penalty p~2:0 for r~0:2 and
r~0:8 (TreatmentII ), and experiments with punishment with
penalty p~4:0 for r~0:2 and r~0:8 (TreatmentIII ). Each
subject played 25 periods during approximately 60 min, and
earned 64.8 RMB (the Chinese unit of currency) on average,
which amounts to approximately 10.3 US dollars.
At the beginning of each experiment, subjects read written
instructions that explained the payoff matrix and the rules of the
game. To avoid misunderstanding the instructions, subjects were
asked to calculate their own payoff for several examples, and they
had to arrive at the correct numbers in order to be allowed
participation. After the experiment started, participants marked
their decisions on a computer screen using the experimental
software z-Tree. In every period, subjects were informed of their
own decision and their monetary payoff on the computer screen.
Cooperators were allowed to punish defectors during the
punishment stage of TreatmentII and TreatmentIII . Each
subject’s final score was summed over all periods, and subjects
earned an income proportional to their final score (1 RMB for
each score point).
Supporting Information
Text S1 Additional information supporting the main
conclusions of this paper. The document contains instructions
that were given to participants of Treatments I, II and III, details
of the regression analysis, and additional results on the evolution of
the cooperation level, the rate of strategy changes during the
economic experiments, and the percentages of strategies that were
employed by the participants.
(PDF)
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